

# CURRICULUM VITAE: JOHN M. DEPOE

## EDUCATION

Ph.D. Philosophy, University of Iowa

Dissertation: "A Defense of the Knowledge Argument"

Director: Richard A. Fumerton      Successfully defended on 08/27/2010

M.A. Philosophy, Western Michigan University

M.A. Religion, Hardin-Simmons University

Thesis: "Human Freedom and Divine Foreknowledge: An Analysis of Selected Solutions" Director: Dan R. Stiver

B.A. Philosophy and Theology, Hardin-Simmons University

## PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT

Fall 2010: Instructor, Black Hawk College

## AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION

Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Religion

## AREAS OF COMPETENCE

History of Modern Philosophy, Logic, Ethics

## PUBLICATIONS

### PEER-REVIEWED JOURNAL ARTICLES

"Defeating the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservatism," *Philosophical Studies*, forthcoming.

"Williamson on the Evidence for Skepticism," *Southwest Philosophical Studies*, forthcoming.

"Vindicating a Bayesian Approach to Confirming Miracles: A Response to Jordan Howard Sobel's Reading of Hume," *Philosophia Christi* 10, no. 1 (2008): 229-38.

"In Defense of Classical Foundationalism: A Critical Evaluation of Plantinga's Argument that Classical Foundationalism is Self-Refuting," *The South African Journal of Philosophy* 26, no. 3 (2007): 245-51.

"Theism, Atheism, and the Metaphysics of Free Will," *Southwest Philosophical Studies* 27 (2005): 36-44.

### **BOOK CHAPTERS AND INVITED ARTICLES**

“Gettier’s Argument against the Traditional Account of Knowledge,” in *Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy*, eds. S. Barbone and M. Bruce (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, forthcoming).

“Berkeley’s Master Argument for Idealism,” in *Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy*, eds. S. Barbone and M. Bruce (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, forthcoming).

“The Significance of Religious Disagreement,” in *Taking Christian Moral Thought Seriously: The Legitimacy of Christian Thought in the Marketplace of Ideas*, edited by Jeremy Evans (Nashville: Broadman & Holman Academic, forthcoming).

### **BOOK REVIEWS**

Double book review (with James McGlothlin) of Angus Menuge’s *Agents Under Fire* (Rowman and Littlefield 2004) and Victor Reppert’s *C. S. Lewis’ Dangerous Idea* (InterVarsity 2003) in *Faith and Philosophy* 26, no. 3 (2009): 339-346.

Double book review of Daniel Dennett’s *Breaking the Spell* (Viking 2006) and Richard Dawkins’s *The God Delusion* (Houghton Mifflin 2006) in *Review and Expositor* 104, no. 4 (2007): 819-21.

Review of Allan Gibbard’s *Thinking How to Live* (Harvard University Press 2003) in *Philosophia Christi* 7, no. 1 (2005): 219-221.

### **RESPONSES TO MY PUBLISHED WORK**

Huemer, Michael. “Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-Defeat: A Reply to DePoe.” *Philosophical Studies*, forthcoming.

Rausser, Randal. *Theology in Search of Foundations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pages 104-105.

Klein, R. T. “What Kind of Foundationalism has Plantinga Refuted?” *South African Journal of Philosophy* 28, no. 3 (2009).

### **ACADEMIC PRESENTATIONS (SELECTED)**

“Bergmann’s Dilemma and Internalism’s Escape” – University of North Florida, January 25, 2010, by invitation.

“How to Confirm a Miracle: A Bayesian Approach” – the American Philosophical Association Central Division meeting 2007.

“Williamson on the Evidence for Skepticism” – the New Mexico/West Texas Philosophical Society, March 30-31, 2007.

“A Bayesian Analysis of the Cumulative Effects of the Independent Eyewitness Testimony for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ” – the Midwest Regional Society of Christian Philosophers meeting, April 7-9, 2005.

“Theism, Atheism, and the Metaphysics of Free Will” – the New Mexico/West Texas Philosophical Society, March 26-28, 2004.

**TEACHING EXPERIENCE** (For more details, see <http://www.johndepoe.com/teaching>)**Introduction to Philosophy:** 8 sections as Instructor, 2 as Teaching Assistant**Ethics:** 2 sections as classroom Instructor, 2 sections as online Instructor**Principles of Reasoning (Logic):** 3 sections as Instructor**Critical Reasoning:** 1 section as Instructor, 2 as Teaching Assistant***Black Hawk College***

Semester/ Year	Course Title	Role	Sections	Enrollment
Fall 2010	Introduction to Philosophy	Instructor	1	30
Fall 2010	Ethics (Classroom)	Instructor	2	30 + 30
Fall 2010	Ethics (Online)	Instructor	2	30 + 21

***University of Iowa***

Semester/ Year	Course Title	Role	Sections	Enrollment
Spring 2009	Introduction to Philosophy	Instructor	1	39
Fall 2008	Introduction to Philosophy	Instructor	1	37
Spring 2008	Introduction to Philosophy	Instructor	1	32
Fall 2007	Introduction to Philosophy	Instructor	1	34
Spring 2007	Principles of Reasoning	Instructor	2	33 + 31
Fall 2006	Principles of Reasoning	Instructor	1	23

***Western Michigan University***

Semester/ Year	Course Title	Role	Sections	Enrollment
Spring 2006	Introduction to Philosophy	Instructor	1	29
Fall 2005	Introduction to Philosophy	Instructor	2	25 + 25
Summer 2005	Critical Thinking	Instructor	1	25
Spring 2005	Introduction to Philosophy	Assistant	2	25* + 25*
Fall 2004	Critical Thinking	Assistant	2	25* + 25*

(\* Indicates number is estimate)

**ACADEMIC AWARDS (SELECTED)**

**SEASHORE BALLARD DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP (2009-2010)** – a competitive university-wide fellowship awarded by the university's graduate college. Competition is open to any graduate student in the University of Iowa that is intending to finish his or her dissertation in the next school year is eligible.

**THE HEMPHILL GRADUATE AWARD (2003)** – the Graduate School awards one graduate student from the entire university who has excelled in academic studies, possesses character and behavior consistent with the University's purpose, and exhibits potential for significant contribution to his/her chosen field.

**THE LOGSDON SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY GRADUATE STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT AWARD (2003)** – the faculty of the Logsdon School of Theology awards one graduate student from their department who best reflects the ideals of the Logsdon School of Theology, including excellence in scholarship.

## RESEARCH INTERESTS

My research interests primarily revolve around issues that are relevant to the intersection of epistemology and metaphysics, especially philosophy of mind. In my dissertation, I argue for property dualism partly by embracing an epistemology that is based on direct acquaintance and a descriptivist account of meaning. Much of my prospective work will be addressed at motivating and defending the epistemological commitments that I use in my dissertation, which can be broadly characterized as following the tradition of classical foundationalism. For example, I am engaged in the issues on the nature of justification both the internalism/externalism debate and the controversies about the structure of justification (e.g., foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism). In addition to defending and motivating my epistemology in contrast to its most plausible competitors, I am also deeply interested in resolving the problem of skepticism, which has led me to work on the epistemological applications of probability theory and inference to the best explanation. My research in philosophy of mind focuses primarily on the mind-body problem and the nature of consciousness. In addition to defending the Knowledge Argument for property dualism, much of my research presents critical responses to contemporary physicalist theories of mind and consciousness.

As an offshoot from my research in epistemology and philosophy of mind, I have been drawn to studying the early modern era of European philosophy (e.g., Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid). I have pursued some research in this field especially as it has been relevant my previously stated interests. Additionally, I have some interests in the philosophy of religion where my background in epistemology and philosophy of mind can contribute to the field as well as my prior research from my master's degree in religion.

## OTHER PROFESSIONAL SERVICE (SELECTED)

President, University of Iowa Graduate Philosophical Society (2007-2008, 2008-2009).

Conference Organizer and Session Chair – the University of Iowa Graduate Philosophical Society's 2009 Spring conference, April 10-11, 2009.

Conference Organizer – the University of Iowa Graduate Philosophical Society's 2008 Fall conference, November 1, 2008.

Conference Organizer and Session Chair – University of Iowa Graduate Philosophical Society's 4<sup>th</sup> Annual Graduate Student Conference, March 28-29, 2008.

Commentator on Lijun Yuan's "Hume's Principle of Sympathy" – the New Mexico/ West Texas Philosophical Society meeting, March 27-29, 2009.

Conference Organizer – the University of Iowa Graduate Philosophical Society's 2007 Fall conference, November 3, 2007.

Commentator on Blake Roeber's "Does the Theist Have an Epistemic Advantage over the Atheist?" – the University of Iowa Graduate Philosophical Society's 3<sup>rd</sup> Annual Graduate Student Conference, April 27-28, 2007.

Commentator on John Churchill's "Accidental Necessity and Interventionist Theism" – the University of Texas Graduate Conference, April 3-4, 2003; theme: Time, Tense, and Change.

## DISSERTATION PRÉCIS

### “A Defense of the Knowledge Argument”

Dissertation Committee: Richard Fumerton (director), David Cunning, Evan Fales, Ali Hasan, and Fred Skiff.

The Knowledge Argument is probably best known from Frank Jackson’s well-known thought experiment that involves Mary, a scientist who knows all the physical truths and their deductive implications, but who (for whatever reasons) has never experienced colors besides black-and-white. Mary, then, sees color for the first time, which intuitively underwrites the claim that Mary learns something new – what it’s like to see red. From this many have concluded that physicalism is false. Of course, this thought experiment has not been the last word on the subject. My dissertation defends the Knowledge Argument by defending two key premises. The first is the Physical Knowledge Intuition (PKI), which states that if complete possession of all knowledge of physical truths isn’t sufficient to provide all propositional knowledge of the actual world, then physicalism is false. I take the PKI to be a logical corollary to the concept of physicalism, which I defend in chapter 1. In chapter 2, I argue for the second premise, the Knowledge Intuition (KI), which states that complete possession of all knowledge of physical truths isn’t sufficient to provide all propositional knowledge of the actual world, namely knowledge of the subjective character of conscious experience. Here I defend a foundationalist account of knowledge that is based on direct acquaintance to justify the KI. The rest of the project focuses on responding to physicalist objections, which make up the bulk of the literature on the Knowledge Argument. Chapter 3 responds to physicalist objections that deny Mary learns anything new from her first experience of color. The fourth chapter responds to physicalists who accept that Mary comes to learn something new, but deny that Mary’s knowledge is propositional or factual knowledge. In chapter 5, I respond to physicalists who accept that Mary comes to know a new fact, but who deny that this new factual knowledge falsifies physicalism. The sixth chapter addresses and rebuts the concern that the Knowledge Argument can be applied against dualism just as easily as the argument applies to physicalism.

## REFERENCES

Richard A. Fumerton, F. Wendell Miller Professor of Philosophy, University of Iowa  
David Cunning, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Iowa  
Evan Fales, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Iowa  
Ali Hasan, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Iowa  
Timothy McGrew, Professor of Philosophy, Western Michigan University  
Dan Stiver, Professor of Theology, Logsdon Seminary