John M. DePoe
Research


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Statement of Research Interests

My research interests primarily revolve around issues that are relevant to the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of mind. In my dissertation, I argue for property dualism partly by embracing an epistemology that is based on direct acquaintance and a descriptivist account of meaning. Much of my prospective work will be addressed at motivating and defending the epistemological commitments that I use in my dissertation, which can be broadly characterized as following the tradition of classical foundationalism. For example, I am engaged in questions on the nature of justification (e.g., conceptual analysis of justification, internalism/externalism debate) and the structure of justification (e.g., foundationalism, coherentism, infinitism). In addition to defending and motivating my epistemology in contrast to its most plausible competitors, I am also deeply concerned with resolving the problem of skepticism, which has led me to work on the epistemological applications of probability theory and inference to the best explanation. My research in philosophy of mind focuses primarily on the mind-body problem and the nature of consciousness. In addition to defending the Knowledge Argument for property dualism, much of my research presents critical responses to contemporary physicalist theories of mind and consciousness.

As an offshoot from my research in epistemology and philosophy of mind, I have been drawn to studying the early modern era of European philosophy (e.g., Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid). I have pursued some research in this field especially as it has been relevant to my previously stated interests. Additionally, I also have some interests in the philosophy of religion where my background in epistemology and philosophy of mind, together with my prior research from my master’s degree in religion, will help me make significant, distinctive contributions to the field.

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Philosophy Papers

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Dissertation

The title of my dissertation is "A Defense of the Knowledge Argument." The Knowledge Argument challenges the physicalist conception of the human mind by arguing that physical information by itself is not sufficient to provide complete knowledge of the mind. In effect, the Knowledge Argument intends to show that qualia, the properties that characterize what it's like to have conscious experience, cannot fit in a physicalist ontology of the mind. Consequently, a dualist ontology of the mind—one where there are irreducible mental properties such as qualia—must be the correct way to characterize the mind. This dissertation will defend the Knowledge Argument by supporting the underlying claims of the Knowledge Argument. Among other things, this will include explaining what a physicalist ontology of the mind is, how conscious experience of qualia cannot fit with that account of the mind, and how it is that we can secure knowledge of our qualitative conscious experiences.

I will also consider and respond to various strategies that physicalists give in response to the Knowledge Argument. Some of these responses include the rejection that knowledge of qualia are not entailed by complete knowledge of the human brain, that knowledge of qualia is merely know-how, knowledge of qualia is knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge of qualia is indexical knowledge, and the inability to know about qualia from physical information alone is not a problem for physicalism. The next part of the dissertation addresses the concern that the Knowledge Argument can be used against the dualist position, which many of its critics claim.

Below, I have provided a brief chapter-by-chapter synopsis.

"A Defense of the Knowledge Argument"


Chapter 1: The Distinction between Physicalism and Dualism
The first part of my dissertation will explain and justify how and why I make important conceptual distinctions that are fundamental to my project. For example, I will argue for a specific way to demarcate physical from non-physical properties as well as how to characterize physicalism and property dualism. To accomplish this task, I will survey and critically assess different accounts of physicalism and dualism. Another important task in this chapter is to show a condition under which physicalism is false, which I call the Physical Knowledge Intuition.

Chapter 2: The Case for the Knowledge Argument
The second chapter will present the positive case for the Knowledge Argument. This will involve unpacking and justifying the basic intuitions that proponents of the argument intend to convey through various thought experiments. I will support the Knowledge Argument with a defense of foundational empirical knowledge acquired through one’s direct acquaintance of the “phenomenal givenness” of conscious experience. My view is that this account of foundational knowledge is sufficient to secure propositional knowledge of one’s qualitative conscious experience. I will defend the role of direct acquaintance to secure foundational knowledge against criticisms such as the Sellarsian dilemma and the problem of the speckled hen.

Chapter 3: Objections to the Knowledge Argument that Deny Mary Learns Anything New
There are two important physicalist responses that question the legitimacy of the Knowledge Argument because, they claim, the Knowledge Argument is illusory in certain ways. For example, Daniel Dennett has argued that Mary would know everything from her exhaustive physical information, and thereby she would know the character of qualitative mental states as well. Frank Jackson, the original proponent of the Knowledge Argument, has reneged his allegiance to the argument on the grounds that representational mental states have a diaphanous and illusory quality. I will examine these objections and show why they are not tenable physicalist responses to the Knowledge Argument.

Chapter 4: Objections to the Knowledge Argument that Deny Mary Learns New Propositions
Most physicalists have not been able to resist the intuition that Mary learns something new. Some have responded by claiming that Mary’s new knowledge is not propositional. Instead, they claim that her knowledge is merely know-how or knowledge by acquaintance. In this chapter I will examine these attempts to undermine the Knowledge Argument and show how they cannot be used to dodge the conclusion that Mary acquires new propositional knowledge.

Chapter 5: Objections to the Knowledge Argument that Claim that Mary’s Propositional Knowledge is Consistent with Physicalism
The last stand for physicalists is to accept that Mary acquires new propositional knowledge when she is acquainted with phenomenal qualitative mental states, but to claim that this new propositional knowledge is consistent with physicalism. I will critically assess the most prominent approaches to this response. First, I will respond to those who take the new propositional knowledge to be indexical knowledge. Then, I will rebut the popularly touted "recognitional concepts" strategy used by physicalists to explain how Mary comes to know a new proposition about an old fact.

Chapter 6: The Knowledge Argument and Self-Refutation
According to some of its critics, the Knowledge Argument proves too much. Not only does it disprove physicalism, but it also can be applied to any systematic metaphysical view of the world including dualism. This chapter will explore the various ways that critics have tried to show that the Knowledge Argument is self-refuting and how each attempt involves a misunderstanding of the Knowledge Argument or the metaphysics of dualism.

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