John M. DePoe
Research
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Research Interests
My research interests primarily revolve around issues that are relevant to the intersection of epistemology and metaphysics, especially philosophy of mind. In my dissertation, I argue for property dualism partly by embracing an epistemology that is based on direct acquaintance and a descriptivist account of meaning. Much of my prospective work will be addressed at motivating and defending the epistemological commitments that I use in my dissertation, which can be broadly characterized as following the tradition of classical foundationalism. For example, I am engaged in questions on the nature of justification (e.g., conceptual analysis of justification, internalism/externalism debate) and the structure of justification (e.g., foundationalism, coherentism, infinitism). In addition to defending and motivating my epistemology in contrast to its most plausible competitors, I am also deeply concerned with resolving the problem of skepticism, which has led me to work on the epistemological applications of probability theory and inference to the best explanation. My research in philosophy of mind focuses primarily on the mind-body problem and the nature of consciousness. In addition to defending the Knowledge Argument for property dualism, much of my research presents critical responses to contemporary physicalist theories of mind and consciousness.
As an offshoot from my research in epistemology and philosophy of mind, I have been drawn to studying the early modern era of European philosophy (e.g., Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid). I have pursued some research in this field especially as it has been relevant to my previously stated interests. Additionally, I also have some interests in the philosophy of religion where my background in epistemology and philosophy of mind, together with my prior research from my master’s degree in religion, will help me make contributions to the field.
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Philosophy Papers
Epistemology
"Defeating the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservativism" (pre-print copy of my article in Philosophical Studies152, no. 3 (2011): 347-359)
Abstract: Michael Huemer has argued for the justification principle known as phenomenal conservativism by employing a transcendental argument that claims all attempts to reject phenomenal conservativism ultimately are doomed to self-defeat. My contribution presents two independent arguments against the self-defeat argument for phenomenal conservativism after briefly presenting Huemer's account of phenomenal conservativism and the justification for the self-defeat argument. My first argument suggests some ways that philosophers may reject Huemer's premise that all justified beliefs are formed on the basis of seemings. In the second argument I contend that phenomenal conservativism is not a well-motivated account of internal justification, which is a further reason to reject the self-defeat argument. Consequently, the self-defeat argument fails to show that rejecting phenomenal conservativism inevitably leads one to a self-defeating position.
"Williamson on the Evidence for Skepticism" (pre-print copy copy that is forthcoming in Southwest Philosophical Studies)
ABSTRACT: Timothy Williamson has offered a novel approach to refuting external world skepticism in his influential book, Knowledge and Its Limits. The strategy employed by Williamson is to show that skeptics falsely attribute too much self-knowledge to the epistemic agent when they claim that one's evidence is the same when in a "good case" as it would be in a similar "bad case." Williamson argues that one's evidence is not the same in a good case as it would be in a bad case. My contention is that Williamson's account fails. In order to make his case against skepticism, Williamson must attribute an overly strong conception of evidence to the skeptic, which can be avoided by appealing to a phenomenal concept of evidence. Thus, a different approach must be taken to avoid skeptical consequences.
"In Defense of Classical Foundationalism: A Critical Evaluation of Plantinga's Argument that Classical Foundationalism is Self-Refuting" (pre-print of my article in The South African Journal of Philosophy 26, no. 3 (2007): 245-51) [Direct link to journal]
ABSTRACT: In numerous works Alvin Plantinga has argued that classical foundationalism is a failed theory of knowledge due to its self-referential incoherence. Plantinga's argument, however, falls short of demonstrating that classical foundationalism is self-refuting. To bring
this to light, I will review the form of Plantinga's argument in comparison with other examples of self-refutation. Upon closer inspection, it will be clear that classical foundationalism is not self-refuting as Plantinga claims. Furthermore, I will expose another flaw in Plantinga's argument against classical foundationalism, which shows at best that Plantinga's argument cannot be reconstructed to show that classical foundationalism is improbable. While Plantinga's argument may highlight a challenge for classical foundationalism, his argument does not establish the falsity of classical foundationalism, nor does it offer any other overriding reason to reject it. Thus, Plantinga's criticisms of classical foundationalism are not sufficient by themselves to rule out
the theory's viability.
Philosophy of Religion
"Vindicating a Bayesian Approach to Miracles: A Response to Jordan Howard Sobel's Reading of Hume" (Published in Philosophia Christi 10, no. 1 (2008): 229-38. Posted with the permission of the Philosophia Christi editorial office.)
ABSTRACT: This paper defends a Bayesian approach to confirming a miracle against Jordan Howard Sobel's recent novel interpretation of Hume's criticisms. In his book, Logic and Theism, Sobel offers an intriguing and original way to apply Hume's criticisms against the possibility of having sufficient evidence to confirm a miracle. The key idea behind Sobel's approach is to employ infinitesimal probabilities to neutralize the cumulative effects of positive evidence for any miracle. This paper aims to undermine Sobel's use of infinitesimal probabilities to block a Bayesian approach to confirming a miracle.
"How to Confirm a Miracle: A Bayesian Approach" (Paper given at the 2007 central APA)
"Theism, Atheism, and the Metaphysics of Free Will" (pre-print of my article in Southwest Philosophical Studies 27 (2005): 36-44)
ABSTRACT: Certain atheists and theists have alleged that their philosophical worldviews provide a better means for explaining a strong account of human freedom. Prominent
atheists who claim that only atheism can give a reasonable account of freedom include Antony Flew and Jean-Paul Sartre. J. P. Moreland contends that only theism can account for free will. My thesis is that arguments for and against belief in God cannot be decided on the grounds of these types of free will arguments.
"Human Freedom and Divine Foreknowledge: An Analysis of Selected Solutions"
This is my thesis from my master's degree in religion. The introduction lays out the necessary groundwork and definitions to tackle this difficult issue. Chapter 1, "A Plethora of Solutions," critically evaluates the merits of atheism, divine timelessness, and Augustinianism to solve the given problem. Chapter 2 focuses entirely on a description and critique of open theism. In chapter 3 I explain and defend Molinism against popular critiques (including the grounding objection). I wrote this over two years ago. I am still a Molinist, but I've learned much about philosophy over these years and would change much of my thesis to strengthen and clarify its points.
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