John M. DePoe
Research
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Statement of Research Interests
My research interests primarily revolve around issues that are relevant to the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of mind. In my dissertation, I argue for property dualism partly by embracing an epistemology that is based on direct acquaintance and a descriptivist account of meaning. Much of my prospective work will be addressed at motivating and defending the epistemological commitments that I use in my dissertation, which can be broadly characterized as following the tradition of classical foundationalism. For example, I am engaged in questions on the nature of justification (e.g., conceptual analysis of justification, internalism/externalism debate) and the structure of justification (e.g., foundationalism, coherentism, infinitism). In addition to defending and motivating my epistemology in contrast to its most plausible competitors, I am also deeply concerned with resolving the problem of skepticism, which has led me to work on the epistemological applications of probability theory and inference to the best explanation. My research in philosophy of mind focuses primarily on the mind-body problem and the nature of consciousness. In addition to defending the Knowledge Argument for property dualism, much of my research presents critical responses to contemporary physicalist theories of mind and consciousness.
As an offshoot from my research in epistemology and philosophy of mind, I have been drawn to studying the early modern era of European philosophy (e.g., Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid). I have pursued some research in this field especially as it has been relevant to my previously stated interests. Additionally, I also have some interests in the philosophy of religion where my background in epistemology and philosophy of mind, together with my prior research from my master’s degree in religion, will help me make significant, distinctive contributions to the field.
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Philosophy Papers
Epistemology
*NEW* "Defeating the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservativism" (pre-print copy that is forthcoming in Philosophical Studies) 
Abstract: Michael Huemer has argued for the justification principle known as phenomenal conservativism by employing a transcendental argument that claims all attempts to reject phenomenal conservativism ultimately are doomed to self-defeat. My contribution presents two independent arguments against the self-defeat argument for phenomenal conservativism after briefly presenting Huemer's account of phenomenal conservativism and the justification for the self-defeat argument. My first argument suggests some ways that philosophers may reject Huemer's premise that all justified beliefs are formed on the basis of seemings. In the second argument I contend that phenomenal conservativism is not a well-motivated account of internal justification, which is a further reason to reject the self-defeat argument. Consequently, the self-defeat argument fails to show that rejecting phenomenal conservativism inevitably leads one to a self-defeating position.
"Williamson on the Evidence for Skepticism" (pre-print copy copy that is forthcoming in Southwest Philosophical Studies)
ABSTRACT: Timothy Williamson has offered a novel approach to refuting external world skepticism in his influential book, Knowledge and Its Limits. The strategy employed by Williamson is to show that skeptics falsely attribute too much self-knowledge to the epistemic agent when they claim that one's evidence is the same when in a "good case" as it would be in a similar "bad case." Williamson argues that one's evidence is not the same in a good case as it would be in a bad case. My contention is that Williamson's account fails. In order to make his case against skepticism, Williamson must attribute an overly strong conception of evidence to the skeptic, which can be avoided by appealing to a phenomenal concept of evidence. Thus, a different approach must be taken to avoid skeptical consequences.
"In Defense of Classical Foundationalism: A Critical Evaluation of Plantinga's Argument that Classical Foundationalism is Self-Refuting" (pre-print of my article in The South African Journal of Philosophy 26, no. 3 (2007): 245-51) [Direct link to journal]
ABSTRACT: In numerous works Alvin Plantinga has argued that classical foundationalism is a failed theory of knowledge due to its self-referential incoherence. Plantinga's argument, however, falls short of demonstrating that classical foundationalism is self-refuting. To bring
this to light, I will review the form of Plantinga's argument in comparison with other examples of self-refutation. Upon closer inspection, it will be clear that classical foundationalism is not self-refuting as Plantinga claims. Furthermore, I will expose another flaw in Plantinga's argument against classical foundationalism, which shows at best that Plantinga's argument cannot be reconstructed to show that classical foundationalism is improbable. While Plantinga's argument may highlight a challenge for classical foundationalism, his argument does not establish the falsity of classical foundationalism, nor does it offer any other overriding reason to reject it. Thus, Plantinga's criticisms of classical foundationalism are not sufficient by themselves to rule out
the theory's viability.
Philosophy of Religion
"Vindicating a Bayesian Approach to Miracles: A Response to Jordan Howard Sobel's Reading of Hume" (Published in Philosophia Christi 10, no. 1 (2008): 229-38. Posted with the permission of the Philosophia Christi editorial office.)
ABSTRACT: This paper defends a Bayesian approach to confirming a miracle against Jordan Howard Sobel's recent novel interpretation of Hume's criticisms. In his book, Logic and Theism, Sobel offers an intriguing and original way to apply Hume's criticisms against the possibility of having sufficient evidence to confirm a miracle. The key idea behind Sobel's approach is to employ infinitesimal probabilities to neutralize the cumulative effects of positive evidence for any miracle. This paper aims to undermine Sobel's use of infinitesimal probabilities to block a Bayesian approach to confirming a miracle.
"How to Confirm a Miracle: A Bayesian Approach" (Paper given at the 2007 central APA)
"Theism, Atheism, and the Metaphysics of Free Will" (pre-print of my article in Southwest Philosophical Studies 27 (2005): 36-44)
ABSTRACT: Certain atheists and theists have alleged that their philosophical worldviews provide a better means for explaining a strong account of human freedom. Prominent
atheists who claim that only atheism can give a reasonable account of freedom include Antony Flew and Jean-Paul Sartre. J. P. Moreland contends that only theism can account for free will. My thesis is that arguments for and against belief in God cannot be decided on the grounds of these types of free will arguments.
"Human Freedom and Divine Foreknowledge: An Analysis of Selected Solutions"
This is my thesis from my master's degree in religion. The introduction lays out the necessary groundwork and definitions to tackle this difficult issue. Chapter 1, "A Plethora of Solutions," critically evaluates the merits of atheism, divine timelessness, and Augustinianism to solve the given problem. Chapter 2 focuses entirely on a description and critique of open theism. In chapter 3 I explain and defend Molinism against popular critiques (including the grounding objection). I wrote this over two years ago. I am still a Molinist, but I've learned much about philosophy over these years and would change much of my thesis to strengthen and clarify its points.
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Dissertation
The title of my dissertation is "A Defense of the Knowledge Argument." The Knowledge Argument challenges the physicalist conception of the human mind by arguing that physical information by itself is not sufficient to provide complete knowledge of the mind. In effect, the Knowledge Argument intends to show that qualia, the properties that characterize what it's like to have conscious experience, cannot fit in a physicalist ontology of the mind. Consequently, a dualist ontology of the mind—one where there are irreducible mental properties such as qualia—must be the correct way to characterize the mind. This dissertation will defend the Knowledge Argument by supporting the underlying claims of the Knowledge Argument. Among other things, this will include explaining what a physicalist ontology of the mind is, how conscious experience of qualia cannot fit with that account of the mind, and how it is that we can secure knowledge of our qualitative conscious experiences.
I will also consider and respond to various strategies that physicalists give in response to the Knowledge Argument. Some of these responses include the rejection that knowledge of qualia are not entailed by complete knowledge of the human brain, that knowledge of qualia is merely know-how, knowledge of qualia is knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge of qualia is indexical knowledge, and the inability to know about qualia from physical information alone is not a problem for physicalism. The next part of the dissertation addresses the concern that the Knowledge Argument can be used against the dualist position, which many of its critics claim.
Below, I have provided a brief chapter-by-chapter synopsis.
"A Defense of the Knowledge Argument"
Chapter 1: The Distinction between Physicalism and Dualism
The first part of my dissertation will explain and justify how and why I make important conceptual distinctions that are fundamental to my project. For example, I will argue for a specific way to demarcate physical from non-physical properties as well as how to characterize physicalism and property dualism. To accomplish this task, I will survey and critically assess different accounts of physicalism and dualism. Another important task in this chapter is to show a condition under which physicalism is false, which I call the Physical Knowledge Intuition.
Chapter 2: The Case for the Knowledge Argument
The second chapter will present the positive case for the Knowledge Argument. This will involve unpacking and justifying the basic intuitions that proponents of the argument intend to convey through various thought experiments. I will support the Knowledge Argument with a defense of foundational empirical knowledge acquired through one’s direct acquaintance of the “phenomenal givenness” of conscious experience. My view is that this account of foundational knowledge is sufficient to secure propositional knowledge of one’s qualitative conscious experience. I will defend the role of direct acquaintance to secure foundational knowledge against criticisms such as the Sellarsian dilemma and the problem of the speckled hen.
Chapter 3: Objections to the Knowledge Argument that Deny Mary Learns Anything New
There are two important physicalist responses that question the legitimacy of the Knowledge Argument because, they claim, the Knowledge Argument is illusory in certain ways. For example, Daniel Dennett has argued that Mary would know everything from her exhaustive physical information, and thereby she would know the character of qualitative mental states as well. Frank Jackson, the original proponent of the Knowledge Argument, has reneged his allegiance to the argument on the grounds that representational mental states have a diaphanous and illusory quality. I will examine these objections and show why they are not tenable physicalist responses to the Knowledge Argument.
Chapter 4: Objections to the Knowledge Argument that Deny Mary Learns New Propositions
Most physicalists have not been able to resist the intuition that Mary learns something new. Some have responded by claiming that Mary’s new knowledge is not propositional. Instead, they claim that her knowledge is merely know-how or knowledge by acquaintance. In this chapter I will examine these attempts to undermine the Knowledge Argument and show how they cannot be used to dodge the conclusion that Mary acquires new propositional knowledge.
Chapter 5: Objections to the Knowledge Argument that Claim that Mary’s Propositional Knowledge is Consistent with Physicalism
The last stand for physicalists is to accept that Mary acquires new propositional knowledge when she is acquainted with phenomenal qualitative mental states, but to claim that this new propositional knowledge is consistent with physicalism. I will critically assess the most prominent approaches to this response. First, I will respond to those who take the new propositional knowledge to be indexical knowledge. Then, I will rebut the popularly touted "recognitional concepts" strategy used by physicalists to explain how Mary comes to know a new proposition about an old fact.
Chapter 6: The Knowledge Argument and Self-Refutation
According to some of its critics, the Knowledge Argument proves too much. Not only does it disprove physicalism, but it also can be applied to any systematic metaphysical view of the world including dualism. This chapter will explore the various ways that critics have tried to show that the Knowledge Argument is self-refuting and how each attempt involves a misunderstanding of the Knowledge Argument or the metaphysics of dualism.
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